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Modern Confession Law After Duckworth v. Eagan:
What's the Use of Explaining?
JULIA C. WEISSMAN*
INTRODUCTION
In Miranda v. Arizona,' the Supreme Court created safeguards to protect
an individual's fifth amendment right2 against self-incrimnation in police
interrogation. The Court determined in Miranda that custodial interrogation
is inherently coercive. 3 To ensure that a criminal suspect does not feel
compelled to incriminate herself in the inherently coercive atmosphere of a
police station, a police officer must notify the suspect of her rights under
the fifth amendment before questiomng her.4 Any statements that a suspect
makes while in police custody are inadmissible unless she has first been
advised of her rights, 5 and has voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
waived these rights. 6 Miranda requires that a suspect be advised that:
[Hie has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.7
In a subsequent case, the Court held that the "content of Miranda
warnings [need not] be a virtual incantation of the precise language contained
in the Miranda opinion."18 As long as the officer conveys to the suspect the
* J.D. Candidate, 1991, Indiana Umversity School of Law at Bloormngton; B.A., 1986,
Umversity of Chicago.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V ("No person . shall be compelled in any crumnal case to
be a witness against himself ").
3. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
4. Id. at 444.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 479 (emphasis added).
8. California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 355 (1981) (per curai). In Prysock, an officer
told the juvenile defendant of his right to remain silent and that anything he said could be
Used against him in court. The officer then told him that he had the right to speak with a
lawyer before questiomng, to have the lawyer present during questiomng, to have his parents
present and to have a lawyer appointed at no cost. Id. at 357-58. The Court held that although
the officer did not explicitly tell the suspect that he could have an attorney appointed at no
cost who would be present before and dunng the questiomng, the officer "fully conveyed to
respondent lus rights as required by Miranda." Id. at 361. The Court implied that the warnings
would have been defective if they had linked the defendant's right to counsel to a future point
in time after police interrogation. Id. at 360.
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substance of her Miranda rights beforQ the interrogation, the purposes of
Miranda have been served.9
Duckworth v. Eagan10 marks a further retreat from the precise holding
of Miranda. In Duckworth, the police gave the indigent defendant the
following Miranda warnings before questioning him:
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You
have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against
you in court. You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we
ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning.
You have this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you
cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but
one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to
court. If you wish to answer questions now without a lawyer present,
you have the right to stop answenng questions at any time. You also
have the right to stop answering at any time until you've talked to a
lawyer.1"
In holding the defendant's resulting confession admissible, a majority of
the Supreme Court reasoned that the warnings had sufficiently conveyed to
him his right to have an attorney appointed before questiomng. 2 In contrast,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had found that a suspect could
misunderstand these warnings to mean that if he were indigent, and desired
to have an attorney appointed, the attorney would not be available prior
to questioning but instead would be appointed for him at trial. As a result,
the lower court concluded that the warnings violated Miranda because they
did not provide a "clear and unequivocal warning of the right to appointed
counsel before any interrogation."' 3
One of the justifications put forth by the Miranda Court for requiring
pre-interrogation warnings was to ensure that suspects would be aware of
their fifth amendment right not to incriminate themselves when in custody,
where they are particularly vulnerable to pressure from police.' 4 Only a
9. Id.
10. 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989).
11. Id. at 2877 (emphasis in original).
12. Id. Justice O'Connor, id. at 2881-85 (0 'Connor, J., concurring), and Justice Marshall,
id. at 2889-93 (Marshall, J., dissenting), also discussed whether this case falls under Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding that defendant could not use a habeas corpus proceeding
to claim the fourth amendment exclusionary rule if that issue had been fully litigated by the
state court). The issue of whether Stone should be extended to prevent Miranda violations
from being litigated in habeas corpus proceedings is beyond the scope of this Note.
13. Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2875
(1989).
14. According to the Court in Miranda:
In order to combat these [custodial] pressures and to permit a full opportunity
to exercise the privilege against self-incrumnation, the accused must be adequately
and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be
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suspect who understands his rights can truly make a free, voluntary choice
about whether to speak. For this reason, Miranda warnings inform the
suspect not only of his. right to remain silent, but also of Ins right to an
-attorney who can ensure that he understands his rights. This, according to
Miranda, prevents police from taking advantage of a suspect, regardless of
his education or sophistication, who either does not understand or does not
believe that he is free to refuse to answer questions. 5 Nevertheless, while
refusing to overrule Miranda, 6 the Court has tolerated admission of con-
fessions where the suspect has not fully understood his rights under the
fifth amendment. 17
This Note examines how Duckworth fits into the current Miranda doc-
trine. Part I explains the basis of the holding in Miranda that custodial
interrogation is inherently coercive. Part II first describes the Supreme
Court's prophylactic rationale for interpreting cases under Miranda. It then
discusses cases regarding the extent to which a suspect must understand her
rights under Miranda before she can waive them. Finally, Part III argues
that in Duckworth the Court has moved considerably toward abolishing
Miranda's requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver. In doing so,,
Duckworth reflects the Supreme Court's ambivalence about the extent to
fully honored.
For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make
them aware of it-the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its
exercise.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964) ("[N]o system of
criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness
on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights.").
15. As the Miranda Court noted:
It is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb to an interrogator's
imprecations, whether implied or expressly stated, that the interrogation will
continue until a confession is obtained or that silence in the face of accusation
is itself damning and will bode ill when presented to a jury. [W]hatever the
background of the person interrogated, a warmng at the time of interrogation is
indispensable to overcome its pressures .
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-69; see also F IaNAv, J. REaD & J. Buci.iy, CiunNAL INmanRo-
OATIoN AND CoNrasioNs 220 (3d. ed. 1985) [hereinafter CRnmINAL INTERRoATioN] (purpose
of Miranda was to assure that all persons, whether educated or not, would be aware of the
right not to incriminate themselves).
16. See, e.g., Butzin v. Wood, 886 F.2d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 1989) (Lay, C.J., dissenting)
(argung that Duckworth reaffirmed the principle that in order to protect the privilege against
self-incrimination, a suspect held for interrogation must be clearly informed of his right to
have an attorney present during interrogation), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2595 (1990); id. at
1019 (Beam, J., concurring) ("[I]n principle Duckworth did reaffirm Miranda."). In its most
basic form, Miranda is still good law. For example, in People v. Trujillo, 784 P.2d 788 (Colo.
1990), statements were suppressed when the defendant was given no Miranda warnings at any
time. Although the prosecution in that case argued that the defendant was not in custody, the
interrogation occurred at the police station and the defendant was not told he was free to
leave. Id. at 789.
17. See infra notes 50-89 and accompanying text.
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which it should protect the constitutional rights of criminal suspects.
I. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION AS A THREAT TO
FIFTH AMENDMMNT RIGHTS
Whenever law enforcement officers interrogate criminal suspects who are
in custody, they must satisfy the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona.'
Writing for the Court in Miranda, Chief Justice Warren explained that the
fifth amendment rights of individuals in that specific situation need special
protection because police have a psychological advantage over a suspect in
custody and can exert great pressure over her. Modem in-custody interro-
gations usually, employ psychological rather than physical pressures.' 9 How-
ever, police often use psychological pressure to "subjugate the individual
to the will of his examiner," even if the resulting statements are not actually
"involuntary" in the sense that they have been obtained by force.2
The Miranda Court outlined some of the techmquds that police officers
use to convince a suspect to confess to a crime. Police are trained to isolate
the suspect in unfamiliar surroundings. 2' The officer, then, has psychological
advantages because a suspect in custody is not free to leave and because
18. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Police need not administer Miranda warnings to a suspect who
meets with them voluntarily. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (finding statements
not preceded by Miranda warnings admissible when a police officer asked a defendant to come
to the police station, told him he was not under arrest, and then discussed a burglary with
him). But see Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (holding that a defendant was in custody
so that the police should have given him Miranda warnings when the questioning took place
in the defendant's bedroom after the police arrested him).
Also, the statement of a custodial suspect must satisfy the requirements of Miranda only if
made in response to interrogation. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (where two
police officers elicited a statement from the defendant by conversing between themselves in
his presence about the danger to children from a missing gun, the Court held that Miranda
did not apply because the statement was not made in response to interrogation).
19. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448.
20. Id. at 457; see Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Cm. L. REv 435 (1987).
According to Professor Schulhofer, Miranda recognized informal compulsion. Compulsion
does not have to result from overcoming a person's will or imposing sanctions upon silence.
It can result from having to make a choice between silence and an unappealing alternative.
Schulhofer distinguished compulsion from actual coercion by pointing out that waiver can
apply to compulsion but not to coercion. No one would knowingly waive her protection from
having her will broken. Id. at 436-53. Long before Miranda, the Court recognized that the
admission of involuntary or coerced confessions violates due process and the fifth amendment
both because such confessions are inherently unreliable and because admitting such confessions
encourages police brutality. See infra note 33.
21. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449-50; see CuaNm.L INTERROGATION, supra note 15. The book
was designed to serve as a manual for police interrogations. It advises law enforcement officers
of the techniques they should use to effectively interrogate criminal suspects. For example,
according to the authors, when setting up the interrogation room, the interrogator should:
Remove all distractions. Interrogation rooms should not contain objects that
would in anyway distract the attention of the person being interviewed. Even
small, loose objects, such as paper clips or pencils, should be out of the suspect's
[Vol. 66:825
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interrogation takes place on the interrogator's "turf." When the suspect is
at home with family and friends who are lending moral support, he is
"more keenly aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his ...
criminal behavior." 22 But "[in [the investigator's] own office ... [t]he
atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the forces of the law." 2 In addition,
officers use interrogation techniques that prey on the suspect's psychological
weaknesses.2 The Miranda Court believed that adequate warnings would
dispel this coercion. As a result, many of the interrogation techmques the
Miranda Court discussed continue to be legal, so long as the suspect
understands his rights and knowingly waives them. 25 If an officer notifies
the suspect of his rights before interrogation, and the suspect knowingly
and intelligently waives those rights, any resulting statement is presumed to
be the product of free choice rather than police pressure, and will not
violate the fifth amendment. 26
reach so that he cannot pick up and fumble with anything during the course of
the interrogation. Tension-reieving activities of this sort can detract from the
effectiveness of the interrogation, especially during the critical phase when a
guilty person may be trying desperately to suppress an urge to confess.
Id. at 29 (emphasis in original). The Court in Miranda quoted extensively from the first
edition of this book to demonstrate how custodial interrogation can be coercive. Miranda, 384
U.S. at 449-55 (citing F INBAu & J. REID, CRIMNAL INTERRooATio N AND CONFESSIONS (1962)).
22. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449-50 (citing C. 0 'HARA, FuNDAmENTALS OF CRImINAL INWvs-
TIoAToN 99 (1956)).
23. Id., see also Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARv. L.
Rsv. 42, 51 (1968) ("[W]hile isolated physically and socially from the groups which usually
validate his ideas [the suspect] may well change his stated beliefs in the face of contradictory
assertions of 'fact,' emotional inducements, and the possibility of gaining social acceptance.").
Driver uses psychological and social science data to explain why custodial interrogations tend
to be coercive.
24. For example, officers are instructed to "display an air of confidence in the suspect's
guilt and from outward appearance to maintain only an interest in confirming certain details
. to put the subject in a psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what
the police purport to know already-that he is guilty." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450. The officer
first acts friendly to the suspect and tells him that what he did was not his fault but the fault
of the victim or society. Id. If that does not work, the investigator "must rely on an oppressive
atmosphere of dogged persistence interrogat[ing] steadily and without relent, leaving the
subject no prospect of surcease." Id. (citing C. O'HAA, FuN AmENTAis op CnaNAL INVES-
TIOATON (1956)).
25. Id. at 458; see also Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 460-61 (suggesting that once the
Court determined that custodial interrogation was inherently coercive, the warning requirement
was a compromise to allow police to continue to obtain confessions).
26. See Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and
Modern Confessions Law, 84 Mici. L. REy. 662, 663 (1986) (arguing that these techmques,
while still legal, are fundamentally at-odds with the premises of Miranda). Grano argues that,
while there is nothing morally wrong with the police taking advantage of the suspect's
psychological and intellectual weaknesses in order to obtain a confession, if the premises of
Miranda are true, then a suspect should not be able to waive is rights at all. Id.
Miranda specified that a police officer cannot obtain a valid waiver by trickery. Miranda,
384 U.S. at 476. Therefore, some of the techniques that concerned the Court in Miranda are
no longer legal. For example, before Miranda, if a suspect wished to invoke is right to
1991]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
II. EVOLUTION OF THE MIRANDA DocTRN
A. The Balancing Approach
The pre-interrogation warmngs required by Miranda v Arizona27 were
not prinarily intended to protect a criminal defendant's interests m a truthful
determunation of guilt or innocence, but .rather to protect the dignity of the
accused.2 Miranda specifically protects the fifth amendment privilege against
self-mcrimnation wich prevents the government from forcing an individual
to aid in his own prosecution.29 Supporters of Miranda argue that even if
it does not itself seem offensive for police to obtain confessions without
providing Miranda warrungs, the use of those confessions to convict the
suspect violates the dignity of the individual, and therefore violates the fifth
amendment.?0
silence, the investigator might advise the suspect that if he remained silent, he would look like
he had something to hide. Also before Miranda, if the suspect requested to speak with an
attorney, the officer might have suggested that if the suspect were innocent, he didn't need
an attorney and should save himself the expense. Id. at 454 (footnote omitted).
In addition, extreme police pressure that .'wynngs a confession out of an accused against
his will' violates due process. Colorado v. Conneily, 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986) (quoting
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960)); see infra note 33.
27. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
28. But see Driver, supra note 23, at 51-52 (discussing an empirical study that shows that
oppressive interrogation tactics can cause a person to alter her memory of an event, leading
her to confess to something she did not do).
The Court has long used a due process analysis to find confessions inadmissible when they
are involuntary and therefore unreliable. See, e.g., Stem v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). But see Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167 (citing Lisenba
v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)) ("The aim of the requirement of due process is not
to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of
evidence, whether true or false.").
29. Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession Law: The 1986 and 1987 Supreme Court Terms,
67 TEx. L. Rav 231, 262 (1988) ("[C]ompelling a person to participate actively in a procedure
designed to condemn and penalize lur offends human dignity."). Tlue fifth amendment privilege
was originally developed as a response to the inquisitions of the Star Chamber which "placed
a premium on compelling subjects of the investigation to admit guilt from their own lips."
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974); see also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52 (1964):
The privilege against self-incrimination reflects our unwillingness to
subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury
or contempt; our preference for an accusatonal rather than an inquisitorial system
of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by
inhumane treatments and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "fair
state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone
until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government
in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load "
Id. at 55 (citations omitted) (quoting 8 WioMoiu, EVDENCE 317 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)).
30. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitution-
ally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MiCH. L. R-v. 907, 917
(1989) (arguing that "Miranda doctrine ought to focus on the impropriety of using rather than
obtaimng the evidence").
[Vol. 66:825
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Since the Warren Court decided Miranda in 1966, the Supreme Court
has moved away from the precise holding of that case-that custodial
confessions not satisfying Miranda's requirements always require exclusion.3'
Characterizing Miranda as "prophylactic," subsequent decisions have rea-
soned that while the Miranda requirements serve to ensure that the state
does not violate the fifth amendment, a violation of Miranda is not in itself
a violation of the fifth amendment. The Miranda rules are prophylactic in
the sense that while they provide a solution for the fifth amendment
problems inherent in custodial interrogation, the Constitution does not
require that particular solution. 32 As a result, so long as the state does not
violate either due process or the fifth amendment itself by admitting a
confession that has actually been coerced, 33 the Constitution does not require
per se exclusion of the statement. Instead, in formulating rules for when to
exclude confessions obtained in violation of Miranda, the Court has balanced
the extent to which excluding the statement would further Miranda's goals
against the extent to which exclusion would hamper law enforcement.
The Court first began to limit Miranda based on the "prophylactic"
rationale in Harris v. New York. 4 In that case, the Court held that the
31. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
32. See Tucker, 417 U.S. 433; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (requinng the stated
warnings or a fully effective equivalent).
33. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (applying the fifth amendment to the states
and holding that the use of involuntary confessions violates the fifth amendment).
Before Malloy applied the fifth amendment to the states, the Supreme Court had held that
the use of involuntary confessions violates due process because such statements tend to be
unreliable, because they are unfair to the defendant and because excluding them deters unlawful
police conduct. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (the police held a
defendant incommunicado for sixteen hours and refused to let hun call his wife until he
confessed); Townsend v. Sam, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (a police doctor injected a defendant, who
was suffering from withdrawal, with "truth serum"); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961) (the police threatened to take a suspect's wife into custody if he did not confess);
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960) (a mentally ill suspect questioned in a
tiny room for eight to rune hours); Brown, 297 U.S. 278 (confessions obtained through physical
torture); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 312 (1985) (actual "coercion" occurs when
the police use "violence or other deliberate means calculated to break [the suspect's] will").
But see Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (a confession held constitutionally admissible because the
police complied with Miranda although the defendant, at the time he confessed, was insane
and was hearing voices telling him to confess); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (a
confession was voluntary even though the police tricked the defendant by misrepresenting to
him during interrogation that a co-conspirator had confessed); People v. Thompson, 50 Cal.
3d 134, 785 P.2d 857, 266 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1990) (a statement was voluntary even though the
police told the defendant that if he made a statement he could exonerate his pregnant girlfriend
and have her released from custody).
34. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The Harris Court did not actually use the term "prophylactic,"
but analyzed Miranda as if it were prophylactic and not a per se requirement. It distinguished
a Miranda violation from a coerced statement which would have had to have been excluded
per se; it then determined that the probative value of the uncoerced statement, although it
was obtained in violation of Miranda, outweighed the deterrent effect of excluding it. The
Court first began to describe Miranda as prophylactic in Tucker, 417 U.S. 433. See infra notes
38-41 and accompanying text.
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prosecution may use statements taken in violation of Miranda to impeach
a defendant who chooses to take the stand in his own defense if the
statements are "voluntary," but may not use them in its case in chief.35
The Court distinguished between a statement that does not satisfy the
standards of Miranda and a statement that is not voluntary under a
traditional due process analysis. 36 In balancing the fifth amendment rights
of the defendant against the interests of law enforcement, the Harris
majority focused on Miranda's rationale of deterring police misconduct. It
reasoned that keeping the illegal confession out of the prosecution's case in
chief would provide adequate incentive for police to comply with Miranda.3 7
At the same time, the probative value of the evidence for impeachment
outweighed the likelihood that police would disregard Miranda in hopes
that any resulting confession would be admitted for impeachment. 31
35. Harris, 401 U.S. at 226.
[Tihe federal rule regarding the use of a Miranda-flawed confession for impeach-
ment purposes is inapplicable with regard to a coerced confession. The latter
presents the risk of utilizing a completely false statement against an innocent
person, whereas the former involves only a prophylactic rule unrelated to the
issue of trustworthiness.
CRnaNAL INTERRooArioN, supra note 15, at 307 (footnote omitted).
36. Harris, 401 U.S. at 224 ("Petitioner makes no claim that the statements made to police
were coerced or invoiuntary."); see supra note 33 and accompanying text (containing examples
of cases where confessions were held involuntary).
Professors Dershowitz and Ely claim that Chief Justice Burger mischaracterized the record
in Harris. They argue that the Harris defendant ciaimed throughout the litigation that his
statement was involuntary. The New York state courts had not determined whether the
confession was voluntary because they had erroneously concluded that any inconsistent state-
ment, whether actually coerced or "only" the result of a Miranda violation, could be used to
impeach the defendant's credibility. At oral argument, the defendant's attorney stated that the
defendant was a twenty-three year old addict with a tenth-grade education who, at the time
of his confession, was suffenng from withdrawal and recovering from a car accident in which
he had suffered a concussion. According to Dershowitz and Ely, the Harris Court ignored
this evidence. Dershowitz & Ely, Hams v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the
Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1201-04 (1971).
37. As Chief Justice Burger wrote:
The impeachment process here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the jury m
assessing petitioner's credibility, and the benefits of this process should not be
lost because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct
will be encouraged thereby. Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent
effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence
in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief.
Harris, 401 U.S. at 225.
38. Id. at 225. Under Harris, while the trial court can admit an illegally obtained confession
for impeachment, it must instruct jurors to use the confession solely to ascertain the defendant's
credibility and not as substantive evidence of guilt. Id. at 223. The dissent argued that Miranda
limited all uses of an illegal statement. Otherwise, a defendant who makes inculpatory
statements without the benefit of Miranda warnings would have to forego his right to take
the stand in his own defense or risk that the jury would hear his confession. The defendant
should be free to make his case without the government introducing illegally obtained evidence
as rebuttal. Id. at 229-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 66:825
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According to the Court, "[tihe shield provided by Miranda cannot be
perverted [by the defendant] into a license to use perjury .... "-9
The Court has extended this balancing test to a number of situations.
For instance, in Michigan v. Tucker,40 the police violated Miranda by failing
to inform the defendant of his right to have an attorney appointed before
they questioned him. The defendant's resulting statements led the police to
a witness whose testimony incriminated the defendant. 41 Nevertheless, the
Court upheld a conviction that was based in part upon testimony from that
witness. Reasoning that Miranda was prophylactic and-determining that the
defendant's statements were voluntary in traditional terms, the Court refused
to apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, 42 which would have
required it to exclude information obtained in violation of Miranda for all
purposes.43 As it had in Harris, the Court balanced the interests protected
by excluding the evidence against the interests served by making the evidence
available to the jury.
In another context, the Court in New York v. Quarles"M recognized a
"public safety" exception to Miranda. It determined that the police need
not give Miranda warnngs to a suspect if they need immediate information
in the interests of public safety. 45 In Quarles, three police officers cornered
the defendant in a supermarket after a woman told the officers that he had
raped her at gunpoint. After searching the defendant and finding no gun,
the officers concluded that he must have left the gun in the store. Without
advising him of his Miranda rights, one officer asked hun where the gun
was, and the defendant told the officer. 46 The Court held that the defendant's
statement, along with the gun, were admissible in the defendant's trial.47
The Court determined that because the defendant's statement did not result
from actual coercion, the fifth amendment did not require exclusion.4 The
39. Id. at 226.
40. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
41. Id. at 436-37.
42. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (holding that evidence taken
from a third party as a result of statements made by the defendant at the time of hi§ unlawful
arrest were fruits of that unlawful police activity and must be excluded). The Tucker Court
distinguished Wong Sun because that case involved a fourth amendment violationi which,
unlike a Miranda violation, was itself a violation of the Constitution. Tucker, 417 U.S. at
445-46.
43. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444 ("The prophylactic Miranda warnings are not themselves rights
protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against.
compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.").
44. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
45. Id. at 657 ("We conclude that the need for answers to questions in a situation posing
a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth
Amendment's pnvilege against self-incrimination.").
46. Id. at 652.
47. Id. at 659-60.
48. Id. at 654.
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Quarles Court reasoned that if the officer had read the defendant his rights,
the cost to society would have outweighed the defendant's interest m
receiving the warnings. Had the defendant been reminded of is right to
silence, he may not have made a statement and the police may not have
located the gun as quickly.4
9
B. How Well a Suspect Must Understand His Rights Under the
Current Miranda Doctrine
The Supreme Court has continued to apply this balancing analysis in
recent cases involving a suspect's ability to understand his Miranda rights.
In so doing, the Court has sacrificed Miranda's concern for guarding
individual dignity and dispelling police coercion in exchange for what it
perceives to be enhanced law enforcement.
Miranda requires the prosecution to prove that a defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived both is right to silence and his right to counsel
before any custodial confession will be admitted. 0 In recent decisions, the
Court has continued to assert that the prosecution must overcome a "heavy
burden" before it can demonstrate that a defendant has waived his rights
under Miranda:
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the
sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been
made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if
the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation" reveals
both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may
a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.,
Despite these assertions, however, recent decisions demonstrate that all the
Court requires is that police tell the suspect of his rights in objectively
understandable language before questiomng; the suspect'need not be given
all of the information that would help him fully understand and evaluate
his rights.
49. Id. at 657.
50. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (citation omitted) ("If the interrogation continues without
the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government
to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-
incrimination and is right to retained or appointed counsel."); see Dix, supra note 29, at 237
(observing that the Miranda Court did not expect suspects to waive their nghts very frequently,
but rather expected them to request the presence of counsel most of the time).
51. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S.
707, 725 (1979)). But see Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167-69. The Court rejected "clear and
convincing evidence" as the standard of proof for deternimng waiver of Miranda rights. "[A]
waiver of the auxiliary protections established in Miranda require[s] no lugher burden of
proof" than a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 169.
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An example of the Supreme Court's willingness to sacrifice Miranda's
requirement of a "knowing and intelligent waiver" appeared in a 1985 case,
Oregon v. Elstad.5 2 The Supreme Court in that case held that a suspect
need not appreciate all of the consequences of a waiver in order to
"knowingly" waive his Miranda rights.53 In Elstad, the police went to the
defendant's home and elicited incriminating statements without first inform-
ing him of his Miranda rights.5 4 They then took the defendant to the station,
read him his rights and obtained a written confession.55 The Court held
that, while the first incriminating statement violated Miranda and could not
be admitted;5 6 the second statement complied with Miranda even though
the defendant claimed that when he made that statement he did not know
that his first statement could not be used against him.5 7 The Court argued
that inferring that the defendant made the second statement because he
believed he had already incriminated himself with the first confession is
"speculative and attenuated at best."158 According to the Court, the admin-
istration of Miranda warnings at the police station cured the condition that
made the unwarned confession inadmissible. 59 "Once warned, the suspect
is free to exercise his own volition in deciding whether or not to make a
statement to the authorities. " 60 The Court presumed that a criminal suspect
will understand that a prior un-Mirandized confession does not compel him
to incriminate himself and formally confess to the crime.
The Elstad dissent argued that a suspect who does not understand that
prior admissions cannot be used against him may make the same admission
after being given Mirafida warnings because he thinks that his situation is
hopeless, since the "cat" is already "out of the bag." 61 The majority
52. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
53. Id. at 316 ("This Court has never embraced the theory that a defendant's ignorance
of the full consequences of his decisions vitiates their voluntanness.").
54. Id. at 301.
55. Id. at 301-02.
56. The prosecution did not dispute that those statements were inadmissible. The state
stipulated that the defendant was in custody when he made the first statement, although the
police had not told him that he was under arrest. Id. at 302. However, Miranda does not
apply when a suspect meets with police officers voluntarily. See supra note 18. The Court in
Elstad implied that it might not have found the first statement to be a violation of Miranda
if the state had not conceded the fact of custody. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 315-16.
57. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316, 318.
58. Id. at 313-14.
59. Id. at 310-11 (citation omitted) ("[A] careful and thorough admimstration of Miranda
warnings serves to cure the condition that rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible. The
warning conveys the relevant information and thereafter the suspect's choice whether to exercise
his privilege to remain silent should ordinarily be viewed as an 'act of free will."').
60. Id. at 308.
61. Id. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 331 (discussing similar concepts).
Commentators have argued that the Elstad decision will encourage police to stretch Miranda
further than the holding in that case actually permits. The decision did not authorize police
to exploit a suspect's ignorance and use his first confession as a means of securing a second.
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reasoned, however, that society's interest in efficient law enforcement out-
weighs any interest in providing immunity to suspects for second confes-
sions.62 Nor did the Elstad majority consider it practical to require police
to warn a suspect that his prior statement could not be used against him
in order to remove the taint of a prior unwarned confession. 63 According
to the Court, "[p]olice officers are ill-equipped to pinch-hit for counsel,
construing the murky and difficult questions of when 'custody' begins or
whether a given unwarned statement will ultimately be held adnissible."6
The majority underscored Miranda's requirement that police explicitly in-
form a suspect of his right to have counsel present during interrogation to
advise him on such tricky matters. 65
Similarly, in North Carolina v. Butler,66 the Court upheld the admission
of a confession obtained from a defendant who refused to sign a written
waiver, but still spoke to police. Refusing to rule that Miranda requires per
se that a suspect expressly waive his rights, the Court held that a criminal
suspect can imply waiver through his actions and words.67 Because the
defendant was "adequately and effectively apprised of his nghts,"' '  the
Court presumed that he understood that he did not have to speak with
police. Therefore, because he did speak to the police, the Court concluded
that he had voluntarily waived his rights. 69 The majority's rationale in Butler
implies that it will not require the cnnunal justice system to forego reliable
confessions obtained from suspects who understand their rights and desire
to speak to police, even though they may be unwilling to sign a written
waiver.70
But some police officers will probably interpret the decision to mean they can do just that.
"At a minimum, decisions such as Elstad convey the message that police should not take
Miranda too seriously and that the Court will stretch to uphold admissibility of confessions."
Rosenberg & Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68
N.C.L. REv 69, 95 (1989) (footnote omitted).
62. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 312.
63. Id. at 316.
64. Id. (citing Tanner v. Vincent, 541 F.2d 932, 936 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1065 (1977)).
65. Id.
66. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
67 Id. at 373.
68. Id. at 374; see also Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987). The Barrett Court
refused to suppress a confession from a defendant who refused to sign a written confession
without his attorney present but clearly agreed to speak with the police. According to the
Court, since the defendant had indicated that he-understood his rights, his waiver with regard
to the oral statement was valid, although the prosecution could not have used a written
statement against him.
69. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373 ("The question is not one of form, but rather whether the
defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda
case.").
70. The Butler dissenters argued that for Miranda to be effective suspects must explicitly
waive their Miranda rights for their statements to be admissible. Id. at 378 (Brennan, J.,
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In Colorado v. Spring,7 1 the Court held that a suspect does not have to
be aware of all of the subjects that the interrogation will cover before he
can intelligently waive his right not to incriminate himself.? In that case,
police arrested the defendant, whom they suspected was involved in a
murder, for illegal transportation of firearms. When the police read the
defendant Ins Miranda rights, they did not inform him that they would
question him about the murder as well as about the firearms offense. After
the defendant waived his Miranda rights, the police began to question him
about the firearms offense, but then worked in questions about the murder.
The defendant eventually implicated himself in the murder and at a later
time confessed. 73 The defendant claimed that he did not voluntarily waive
his right to silence or to an attorney with regard to questions pertaining to
the murder. Therefore, he argued, those statements were obtained in vio-
lation of his fifth amendment right against self-incrimnation.
However, the Spring Court held that the defendant's waiver was knowing
and intelligent because the defendant understood from is Miranda warnings
that he had the right not to speak to the officer, the right to have counsel
present and the right to stop talking at any time.74 According to the majority,
"any number of factors could affect a suspect's decision to waive his
Miranda rights, ' 7 5 and police should not be required to "supply a suspect
with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest m deciding
whether to speak or stand by his rights." 76
dissenting). According to the dissent, because the defendant refused to sign the written waiver,
it was not clear whether he understood that speaking with police constituted a waiver of his
right to silence. Id. The dissent pointed out that there was conflicting evidence as to whether
anyone read the defendant his rights or whether he was merely presented with the written
form. It was also not clear whether the defendant knew how to read. Therefore, "if Butler
did not have his rights read to him, and could not read them himself, there could be no basis
upon which to conclude that he knowingly waived them." Id. This, according to Justice
Brennan, "presents a clear example of the need for an express waiver requirement." Id.
71. 479 U.S. 564 (1987).
72. Id. at 577; see also Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982) (When the defendant waived
his Miranda rights with regard to taking a lie detector test, that waiver encompassed questiomng
after the test, even though the defendant may not have realized that he had waived his rights
with regard to such questiomng.).
73. Spring, 479 U.S. at 566. The defendant did not claim that he misunderstood why he
was being questioned at the time that he actually confessed to the murder, but that the
confession should have been suppressed because it was tainted by the incrimnating statements
he made about the murder during the original questiomng. Because the Court found the
original statements admissible, it did not need to determine whether the later confession was
"tainted." "A confession cannot be 'fruit of the poisonous tree" if the tree itself is not
poisonous." Id. at 571-72.
74. Id. at 574-75.
75. Id. at 577 n.9.
76. Id. at 576-77. The dissent argued that the statements of the defendant incriminating
himself in the murder should have been excluded as a violation of Miranda. Justice Marshall
observed:
[A] suspect's decision to waive this privilege will necessarily be influenced by his
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The Supreme Court's willingness to find that suspects have knowingly
and intelligently waived their fifth amendment rights when they do not
necessarily understand those rights seems to reflect an attitude on the part
of a majority of the Court that the fifth amendment does not require police
to discourage suspects from making incrimnating statements. This attitude
is apparent in a recent case which did not concern whether a suspect
understood his Miranda rights but rather whether police must inform the
suspect of external factors that may influence his decision of whether to
request counsel. In Moran v. Burbine,77 when the police read the defendant
his rights and asked him to sign a waiver, they neglected to inform him
that his attorney had phoned and wanted to talk to him before questioning.
78
The defendant agreed to speak to police and did not indicate m any way
that he wanted an attorney present. 79 The Court concluded that because the
police followed the procedures outlined in Miranda, the defendant received
all of the information constitutionally required. s0 The Burbine majority
conceded that requiring police to inform a suspect of her attorney's efforts
to reach her would dispel some of the coercion inherent in the custodial
atmosphere and probably would provide useful information to the suspect.8"
According to the Court, however, this requirement would place too great a
burden on law enforcement by making it more difficult for police to secure
admissions of guilt.82
awareness of the scope and senousness of the matters under investigation.
Additional questiomng about entirely separate and more serious suspicions of
criminal activity can take unfair advantage of the suspect's psychological state,
as the unexpected questions cause the compulsive pressures suddenly to reappear.
Id. at 578, 581.
77. 475 U.S. 412.
78. Id. at 416-17.
79. Id. at 417-18. The defendant was arrested for breaking and entering, and was questioned
by police in Cranston, Rhode Island. The police connected the defendant with a murder that
had occurred several months earlier in Providence and informed the Providence police, who
went to the Cranston police station to investigate. Meanwhile, the defendant's sister, in
response to the defendant's arrest for breaking and entering, called the public defenders' office
to secure representation for her brother. A public defender called the police station and
requested that police not question the defendant until she arrived. A Cranston -detective told
her that they were through with the defendant for the night, when in fact, an hour later, the
Providence police began questiomng the defendant about the murder. Id. at 416-17. Evidence
from the trial court suggested that the officer who spoke to the defendant's attorney was
aware that the Providence police were still investigating the defendant. See id. at 446 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 422.
Once it is determined that a suspect's decision not to rely on his rights was
uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer,
and that he was aware of the State's intention to use his statements to secure a
conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law.
Id. at 422-23.




The Burbne majority refused to adopt a rule that would invalidate a
suspect's waiver of Miranda rights when police failed to inform her of
attempts by her attorney to reach her. In doing so, the Court placed the
government's interest in efficient law enforcement above the suspect's in-
terest in being able to waive her rights knowingly and intelligently.,3 First,
the Court determined that such a rule would make Miranda warnings more
difficult to administer. Police would have difficulty knowing "[tio what
extent [they should] be held accountable for knowing that the accused has
counsel."84 The Court also argued that requirng police to give this additional
information to suspects would disrupt the "subtle balance" of the Miranda
decision. 5 While this rule would handicap investigatory proceedings by
making suspects less likely to speak to police, it would add only marginally
to dispelling coercion.16
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the police had deceived the suspect
in failing to warn him that his attorney had attempted to reach him.87
According to Stevens, the officers did not want the suspect to know that
an attorney was trying to contact him, because with that information he
would have been more reluctant to confess, thus making a conviction for
a brutal murder more difficult to secure. The dissent pointed out the context
of the call of the defendant's lawyer to the police station. "Two Police
Departments were on the verge of resolving a highly publicized, hauntingly
brutal homicide in which . . the police were aware that counsel's advice
to remain silent rmght be an obstacle to obtaining a confession." 8 Stevens
attacked the Court's balancing approach as "profoundly misguided," noting
that every procedural safeguard has the "cost" of making convictions more
difficult to secure.89
IIl. THE DUCKWORTH DECISION
A. The "If and When You Go to Court" Language
Previous cases have upheld admission of confessions when police gave
the suspect the required warnings under Miranda, but failed to inform the
83. Id. at 425 ("While such a rule might add marginally to Miranda's goal of dispelling
the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation, overriding practical considerations counsel
against its adoption.").
84. Id.
85. According to the majority, Miranda represented a compromise between the usefulness
of confessions in law enforcement and the inherent coerciveness of the interrogation process.
While Miranda refused to entirely favor the interest of defendants by requiring that attorneys
be present during every interrogation, it did give defendants "the power to exert some control
over the course of the interrogation." Id. at 426.
86. Id. at 426-27.
87. Id. at 452 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 450.
89. Id. at 457.
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suspect completely about his rights or to give him information that would
bear on his decision of how to exercise those rights.9 Duckworth v Eagan9'
upheld the admission of a confession when the suspect arguably did not
understand the warmngs themselves. In Duckworth, the Court upheld warn-
ings that may not have clearly informed the defendant of his right to have
an attorney appointed prior to questiomng if he could not afford to retain
one.92 The defendant had confessed after police told him that if he were
indigent he could have an attorney appointed "if and when [he went] to
court."
93
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a five-member majority,
"the initial warnings given to respondent touched all of the bases required
by Miranda."94 Telling an indigent suspect that he could have a lawyer
appointed "if and when [he goes] to court" adequately informed him of
his right to have an attorney appointed before questioning because it
90. See supra notes 52-89 and accompanying text.
91. 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989).
92. Id. at 2880.
93. Id. at 2877; see supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. The facts of Duckworth are
more complicated than this holding would suggest. The defendant originally brought Chicago
police to the victim, who had been stabbed rune times. When the victim saw the defendant,
she said, "[w]hy did you stab me?" The defendant volunteered to these officers that he had
been with the woman earlier, that they had been attacked and that several men abducted her.
The next day the case was turned over to Indiana police to whom the defendant volunteered
the same story. Then the defendant received the Miranda warnings in question. He signed the
waiver and repeated the same story. The next morning the defendant was given a new set of
warnings whose adequacy was not an issue in the case. After signing the waiver, the defendant
confessed to stabbing the woman. Id. at 2876-78.
When the defendant made his first statement, in which he denied committing the crime but
admitted being with the woman earlier, warnings were not required because he was not in
custody. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977). The defendant did not alter this story
in the statement taken immediately after the warnings which he contended were msleading,
and so the admission of that statement probably was not an issue for the defense. The
confession whose admission concerned the defendant occurred after Miranda warnings which
were not tainted by the "if and when you go to court" language. Therefore, the defendant
argued that the first misleading warning led him to believe that because he was indigent he
could not secure counsel during interrogation. "[Tihe second warning 'did not explicitly correct
this misinformation."' Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2878 (quoting Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d
1554, 1558 (7th Cir. 1988)).
Therefore, even if the Court had determined that the "if and when you go to court"
language of Eagan's first warning was defective, the majority may still have upheld his later
confession had they determined that the second set of warings cured the defects present in
the first. Cf. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (holding that a second "Mirandized"
statement was not tainted by an earlier admission elicited in violation of Miranda). For a
discussion of Elstad, see supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
94. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2880; see also Califorma v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981).
The Court in Prysock upheld warnings that did not mimic the language in the Miranda
decision, but also said that a suspect's right to counsel cannot be linked to a future event. Id.
at 360. The Duckworth Court distinguished Prysock on the grounds that although the warnings
in Duckworth linked the availability of counsel to a future event, they clearly advised the
defendant of his right to counsel before interrogation. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2880-81. See
supra note 8 and accompanying text for a description of the facts and holding of Prysock.
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accurately portrayed the procedures for appointing counsel in Indiana, where
the interrogations took place. 95 "Under Indiana law, counsel is appointed
at the defendant's initial appearance in court and formal charges must be
filed at or before that heanng.'"' Therefore, if an indigent suspect invokes
his right to counsel, police must cease questioning until after his initial
court appearance.Y Miranda does not require that lawyers be available in
the station house on call.98 Consequently, the Court reasoned that the "if
and when you go to court" language simply anticipated the suspect's
questions about when his lawyer will be appointed.9
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had agreed with the
defendant, who argued that the "if and when you go to court" language
was misleading because it "suggested that 'only those accused who can
afford an attorney have the right to have one present before answering any
questions' ..... ,00 The Seventh Circuit relied on its 1972 decision in United
States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 10 which had struck down warnings
substantially similar to those given to the defendant in Duckworth. In
Twomey, the Court of Appeals had reasoned:
"[The statement that no lawyer can be provided at the moment and
can only be obtained if and when the accused reaches court substantially
restricts the absolute right to counsel previously stated; it conveys the
contradictory alternative message that an indigent is first entitled to
counsel upon an appearance in court at some unknown, future time.
The entire warning is therefore, at best, misleading and confusing and,
95. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2880.
96. Id. (citations omitted).
97. Id. ("If the police cannot provide appointed counsel, Miranda requires only that the
police not question a suspect unless he waives his right to counsel."); see Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (Once the accused has "expressed his desire to deal with the police
only through counsel, [he] is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further commu-
nication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
474 (1966) (If the accused invokes his right to counsel, the interrogation must cease until an
attorney is present.).
98. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 ("This does not mean, as some have suggested, that each
police station must have a 'station house lawyer' present at all times to advise prisoners."),
cited with approval m Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2880.
99. Id. Compare United States v. Harrel, 894 F.2d 120, 125 (5th Cir. 1990) (The Court
of Appeals held that a statement to the defendant that if he could not afford an attorney,
one would be furnished "if the matter went to trial" was not constitutionally defective. In
admitting the statement, the court did not rely exclusively on this ground but also found that
the statement was not custodial.) with State v. Bittick, No. WD 41,387 (Mo. App. May 29,
1990) (LEXIS, States library, Mo file) (The court distinguished Duckworth and held a confession
invalid when an officer told the defendant, "if you want an attorney at this time it would be
your responsibility to contact one." Concluding that the officer's statement "misadvised and
rmsled" the defendant, the court found that the defendant could not have knowingly and
intelligentiy waived is right to the immediate assistance of counsel.).
100. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2880 (citing Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th
Cir. 1988)).
101. 467 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1972).
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at worst, constitutes a subtle temptation to the unsophisticated, indigent
accused to forego the right to counsel at thus critical moment."102
Like the defendant in Twomey, Eagan claimed that he was confused about
his rights because the warning that police read to lum did not inform lum
clearly and unequivocally of his right to have counsel appointed before any
interrogation. 103
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent in Duckworth, agreed with the
Seventh Circuit. He emphasized that Miranda specifically mentioned the
importance of conveying to an indigent suspect that he has the right to
have counsel present "before and during interrogation." '1 0 Marshall argued
that "recipients of police warnings are often frightened suspects unlettered
in the law, not lawyers or judges or others schooled in interpreting legal or
semantic nuance."' 0 5 Therefore, while the warnings in Duckworth may
technically inform a suspect of his rights, many suspects would not be able
to analyze the warnings as the majority had, and would waive their right
to an attorney without understanding that a request to have counsel ap-
pointed would end questioning until counsel arrived. "The majority thus
refuses to recognize that '[t]he warning of a right to counsel would be
hollow if not couched in terms that would convey to the indigent-the
person most often subjected to interrogation-the knowledge that he too
has the right to have counsel present."' " Duckworth seems to follow from
102. United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 467 F.2d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1972) (this
language was cited in Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1988)); see also
Gilpin v. United States, 415 F.2d 638, 641 (5th Cir. 1969) (a warning that used the language
"if and when you go to court" failed to convey to the defendant that he was entitled to
appointment of an attorney "here and now" in light of the fact that the defendant had only
a sixth-grade education and had been drinking heavily the night before). But see Coyote v.
United States, 380 F.2d 305, 307 (10th Ciri. 1967) (upholding the warning, "I can talk to a
lawyer or anyone before saying anything, and the judge will get me a lawyer if I am
broke"), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 992 (1967).
The crucial test is whether the words in the context used, considering the age,
background and intelligence of the individual being interrogated, impart a clear,
understandable warning of all of his rights.
It is always open to an accused to subjectively deny that he understood
the precautionary warning [I]t is for the court to objectively determine
whether in the circumstances of the case the words used were sufficient to convey
the required warning.
Id. at 308.
103. Eagan, 843 F.2d at 1556.
104. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2886 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "A clear and unequivocal
offer to provide appointed counsel prior to questioning is, in short, an 'absolute prerequisite
to interrogation."' Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471).
105. Id. at 2887.
106. Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473); see also Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note
61, at 88:
The "if and when" caveat approved in Duckworth undermines the prior warning
given a suspect that an attorney can be present during interrogation and makes
it appear either that the interrogation will be delayed or that the defendant will
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previous decisions where the Court, while continuing to bow toward Mir-
anda, has not required that a suspect understand his rights beyond the
narrow boundaries of the Miranda warnings themselves. °7
B. The Effect of the Duckworth Decision
In prior decisions regarding the admissibility of confessions elicited after
Miranda-type warnings, the Court engaged in a balancing analysis. On one
side of the balance, the Court placed the possibility that a defendant's
statement was coerced because she might be confused about her rights. On
the other side of the balance, the Court placed the probative value of
confessions and the extent to which requnring the defendant to be fully
informed would hamper law enforcement by preventing police from obtain-
ing confessions. °s In Duckworth, however, the Court did not engage in a
balancing analysis to arrive at its conclusion that the "if and when you go
be entitled to an attorney only at trial. A defendant's nusunderstanding of his
right to counsel acts as an incentive to discuss the matter with police immediately,
despite the absence of counsel, to extricate himself from the confines of the
stationhouse. Thus, after Duckworth, the warnings designed to advise defendants
of their rights may instead be used to mislead them and to induce ignorant
waivers.
107. See supra notes 34-89 and accompanying text for treatment of these prior cases.
108. For instance, the Court in Elstad stated that police officers would have difficulty
adminstering Miranda warnings if they had to determine whether previous statements violated
Miranda. According to the Court, this outweighed the "speculative" possibility that the suspect
would feel compelled, because of his earlier un-Mirandized statement, to confess. Elstad, 470
U.S. at 312-14; see supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text (discussing Elstad).
In Burbine, the balancing was similar. The Court found that adopting the rule urged by the
defendant would hamper the ability of police to obtain confessions while not significantly
decreasing coercion. "This minimal benefit . would come at a substantial cost to society's
legitimate and substantial interest in securing admissions of guilt." Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412, 427 (1986). In addition, a rule that requires police to inform defendants of their
attorneys' attempts to reach them would be difficult for law enforcement to adimmster because
police would not know how much information they would need to provide defendants in
addition to their Miranda rights. Id. at 425; see $upra notes 77-89 and accompanying text
(discussing Burbine).
In North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979), the Court implicitly balanced the possibility
that a court will infer a waiver from a suspect who does not understand his rights against the
interests of police in obtaining confessions from suspects who understand their rights and are
willing to talk, but who may hesitate to sign a written waiver. See supra notes 66-70 and
accompanying text (discussing Butler).
In Spring, the Court was the least explicit about its balancing approach. However, the Court
went to great lengths to explain that the defendant understood that he did not have to answer
any questions that might incriminate him. The Court also stated, "'[W]e have never read the
Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help
him calibrate hs self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights."' Colorado
v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1987) (quoting Burbine, 475 U.S. at 422). In addition, the
Court noted that extending Miranda to require police to inform the suspect of everything that
would affect hs decision about whether to speak would make administration of Miranda




to court" warnings "reasonably 'conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required
by Miranda.""19
It is possible that the Court did not engage in a balancing analysis in
Duckworth because it disbelieved the defendant's claim that he was confused
about his right to counsel, and therefore found no conflict with Miranda.
This is an improbable ground for the decision, however, because it is likely
the Court would have realized that at least some defendants would be
confused by the "if and when you go to court" language. Also, the Court
did not analyze whether Mr. Eagan himself was in fact confused.
Because many suspects will not understand clearly their right to appointed
counsel, the Duckworth Court has approved a tactic which may increase
coercive pressure in the custodial setting by allowing police to include in
Miranda warnings the "if and when you go to court" language. Yet the
Court was silent about what benefits law enforcement would gain from
using this tactic. 10 The Court's reason for allowing this type of police
behavior was probably similar to its reason in Burbine-to make it easier
for police to secure confessions.
Confessions provide extremely powerful evidence against a cnnunal de-
fendant."' This gives police officers an incentive to do whatever they can,
within the law, to obtain a confession from a suspect. The less a suspect
understands about his rights, the more likely he will be to confess, or to
make an inculpatory statement." 2 Therefore, the police department in
109. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2880 (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361).
110. The Court in Duckworth did say that sometimes officers in the field would need to
administer Miranda warnings to a suspect and would not have a Miranda card handy. Id. at
2878-80. The Court probably did not attach much weight to this reasoning. First, it should
not be difficult for a police officer in the field to read Miranda warnings correctly. Kamisar,
Duckworth v. Eagen: A Little-Noticed Miranda Case that May Cause Much Mischief, 25
CRim. L. BuLL. 550, 556-57 (1989) ("How much effort does it take to memorize the warnings
or, if one's memory is weak, to carry a Miranda card? The Chief Justice writes as if
each of the four warnings is inscribed on a separate heavy stone tablet and a given police
department only has one set."). Second, the warnings that the police actually read to the
Duckworth defendant came from a pre-printed waiver form at the police station. Duckworth,
109 S. Ct. at 2877. The state, therefore, could not argue that the arresting officer was in a
bind and had to improvise the Miranda warnings that he read to the suspect.
111. "Triers of fact accord confessions such heavy weight in their determunations that 'the
introduction of a confession makes the other aspects of a trial in court superfluous, and the
real trial, for all practical purposes, occurs when the confession is obtained."' Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 182 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE
316 (2d ed. 1972)); Dix, supra note 29, at 254 ("[C]onfession law generally assumes that
confessions are unusually reliable evidence of a defendant's guilt because these statements are
so contrary to the defendant's interest that they would not have been made unless the defendant
honestly believed them to be accurate.").
112. Kamisar, A Wrong Answer on Police Questioning, Legal Times, July 24, 1989, at 26,
col. 1.
Is there any doubt about what police officers think their superiors expect them
to do? Who has ever heard of a police commissioner congratulating the officer
in charge of a murder case for giving the Miranda warnings so carefully and so
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Duckworth probably considered that if it did not explicitly notify indigent
suspects of their right to have counsel appointed before any questioning,
fewer indigent suspects would request counsel and the department would
obtain more confessions. 13
The Duckworth Court seems to indicate that it is willing to allow police
to administer weaker-even confusing-Miranda warnings solely to decrease
the likelihood that a suspect will exercise his right to an attorney or his
right to silence.114 However, the Burbine decision, as well as other decisions
discussed in this Note, emphasized repeatedly that the defendants' confes-
sions were admissible because even if the police had not provided the
defendants with every piece of useful information, they had clearly informed
them of their right to silence and their right to counsel. The Duckworth
Court, on the other hand, could not make that claim because the defendant
in that case was not clearly informed of his right to have counsel appointed
before questioning.
The Court, it seems, was reluctant to make its balancing analysis express
because it did not want to declare explicitly that the failure of police to
give the defendant a clear statement of his rights was justified by the
interests of law enforcement and the prophylactic nature of Miranda. Had
the Court made this balance explicit, it would have come very close to
overruling Miranda altogether."'
emphatically that the suspect asserted his rights and never said a word about the
case?
Id., see also CRDHNAL INT rGROATION, supra note 15. According to the authors, the typical
Miranda warnings include advising the suspect that he "can decide at any time to exercise
these rights and not answer any questions or make any statements." Although Miranda requires
the officer to discontinue the interrogation once the suspect invokes his rights, the authors
express their belief that Miranda does not actually require the interrogator to tell this to the
suspect, and they advise interrogators to leave it out of the warning. Id. at 279; see also
Brown v. State, 565 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1990) (holding that the police need not inform a suspect
that he can cease answering questions at any time for the warnings to be constitutionally
sufficient); State v. Fecteau, 568 A.2d 1187 (N.H. 1990) (same).
Some commentators argue that there is nothing wrong with securing a confession by taking
advantage of a suspect's lack of sophistication or knowledge. See Grano, supra note 26, at
677 (arguing that seeking the truth is more important than seeking equality in interrogation).
113. Kamisar noted: "The best explanation for the failure of the police to abandon
their version of the warnings is the belief (and, I think, a well-founded one) that their
formulation tends to confuse unsophisticated indigent suspects and to induce them to forgo
the right to counsel at the critical moment." Kanusar, supra note 112, at 26, col. 3.
114. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor showed her disdain for invalidating
confessions that violate Miranda. She argued that Stone v. Powell, 429 U.S. 874 (1976), should
be extended to Miranda cases so that Miranda claims could not be argued on habeas corpus
because the interests in encouraging police to properly adminster the Miranda warnings are
not weighty enough to warrant overturning a state conviction. Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2884
(O'Connor, J., concumng).
115. A satisfactory discussion of the pros and cons of overruling Miranda is beyond the
scope of this Note and has been provided, at length, by other commentators. See Schulhofer,
supra note 20; Grano, supra note 26. For an exhaustive list of commentaries on the subject,
see Dix, supra note 29, at 232 n.l.
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Rather than overrule Miranda, Duckworth instead left Miranda with some
vitality. Lower courts, though often reluctant to reverse a conviction based
on a violation of Miranda, recognize that law enforcement officers at a
mimmum must inform custodial suspects before interrogation of their core
rights under the fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause. As the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed, "unless Miranda is over-
turned, something essentially equivalent to the familiar Miranda recitation
must be conveyed to the suspect." 116 And in the vast majority of police
interrogations, suspects do receive Miranda warnings. Of course, the value
of these warnings for defendants is at best unclear if, as this Note contends,
after Duckworth a suspect need not understand his Miranda warnings to
effectively waive Ins rights.
One reason the Court has refused to overrule Miranda may be that even
when Miranda warnings do not convey every aspect of a suspect's fifth
amendment right not to incriminate herself, they still provide some benefit
to a suspect who is in custody. The warmngs remind the suspect that she
is in a society where her constitutional rights will be protected. By itself
this can reduce some of the compulsion inherent in the custodial setting.17
Similarly, the warnings put a suspect on notice of the seriousness of her
situation, winch may make her more careful about the statements that she
makes." 8 In addition, informing a suspect that she does not have to talk
to police and may consult with an attorney conveys substantively useful
information to that suspect, even if many do not take advantage of their
rights."19
116. United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1079 n.5 (3d Cir. 1990) (upholding a warning
which, in addition to the regular Miranda warnings, informed the suspect that he had the
right to answer questions without a lawyer). Although the court in Cruz did not "endorse"
that statement as part of the usual Miranda recitation, the court determined that it did not
"dilute the substance of the warnings." Id. at 1079.
117. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 ("the warning will show the individual that his interrogators
are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it"); Schulhofer, supra
note 20, at 447 ("Even if [a] sophisticated suspect knows his rights he needs to know
[that] the police know his rights.") (emphasis in original).
118. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 ("this warning may serve to make the individual more acutely
aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system-that he is not in the presence
of persons acting solely in his interest"). In one book, the authors recommend that, in order
to encourage a suspect to confess, officers should interrogate her in a room that does not
remind her of their law enforcement objective. Cinns. INntPROOATioN, supra note 15, at
29. "[TIhe less the surroundings suggest a police detention facility, the less difficult it will he
for the suspect who is really guilty to implicate himself." Id.
119. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court recently required suppression of a defen-
dant's statement when he received no Miranda warnings at all. People v. Trujillo, 784 P.2d
788 (Colo. 1990). Although the defendant was not officially put under arrest, an officer
questioned hum for one-and-one-half hours about an assault and did not tell lum that he was
free to leave. The court believed the defendant when he testified that he thought he had to
answer the officer's questions, and held that the statements violated Miranda, even though it
could have concluded the defendant was not in custody and that Miranda warnings were
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Another reason the Court may have for refusing to overrule Miranda is
that Miranda warnings eliminate the need for case-by-case inquiries into the
voluntariness of defendants' admissions.'20 Although a defendant can always
argue that police conduct during his interrogation was so egregious that his
confession was not the product of his free will, the Court has developed
an extremely high standard for invalidating confessions on that ground. 12'
When police administer Miranda warnings, they wave a magic wand over
the ensuing confession, or at least trigger a strong presumption that any
resulting confession has been voluntarily and freely given. As the cases
discussed in this Note seem to indicate, if the defendant has been read
"something essentially equivalent to the familiar Miranda recitation"'12
before making an incriminating statement, courts can usually admit the
statement without inquiring into whether that statement resulted from
compulsion.iu These reasons may be motivating the Court to continue
upholding Miranda while at the same time limiting it so that it does not
necessarily serve all of the interests that the original Miranda Court sought
to protect.in
unnecessary. Id. at 790, 792. Had the officer in Trujillo informed the defendant of his right
to silence and his right to consult with an attorney, the defendant would have known that he
did not have to speak to the officer.
120. "'A principal objective of [Miranda] was to establish safeguards that would liberate
courts insofar as possible from the difficult and troublesome necessity of adjudicating in each
case whether coercive influences, psychological or physical, had been employed to secure
admissions or confessions."' People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 328, 748 P.2d 307, 319, 243 Cal.
Rptr. 369, 381 (1988) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714, 717,
441 P.2d 625, 626, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817, 818 (1968).
121. Even if a suspect has been given Miranda warnings, there are limits to what an
interrogator can do to obtain a confession. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
122. Cruz, 910 F.2d at 1079 n.5.
123. A 1986 Supreme Court decision illustrates this point. In Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, the
Court held that if officers admimster adequate Miranda warnings to a suspect and do not
physically coerce him, the suspect does not have to be thinking rationally when he waives his
rights. In Connelly, the defendant approached a police officer and said he wanted to confess
to a murder. The officer read the defendant is rights on several occasions and clearly conveyed
to him that he did not have to talk to the officer. However, the state-appointed psychiatrist
testified that the defendant was insane at the time of Ius confession and not competent to
stand trial. According to this expert, the defendant was experiencing "'command hallucina-
tions' which interfered with his 'ability to make free and rational choices."' Id. at 161
(quoting the trial record). The defendant testified that the voice of God told him to fly from
Boston to Denver and confess to the murder. Id.
The Court held that the defendant's statements violated neither due process nor the fifth
amendment because there was no improper police conduct. According to the Court, the
Constitution protects citizens from coercion by state actors, but not from their own internal
nature or from conduct by third parties. Id. at 170-71. This suggests that the Supreme Court
is allowing courts to presume voluntanness based on objective indicia such as the administration
of Miranda warnings rather than engaging in case-by-case determinations.
124. Some commentators argue that defendants are worse off under Miranda because courts
can look at whether warnings have been given and do not have to worry about whether a




At the core of Miranda is the idea that police violate a suspect's fifth
amendment rights when they use compulsion in custodial interrogations to
overpower a suspect's will. But in recent years the Supreme Court has
increasingly found that the interests of law enforcement in securing crimnal
convictions outweigh the interests of the criminal defendant in understanding
her fifth amendment rights so that her confession results entirely from her
free choice. While the Court appears unwilling to make "one more move"
to eliminate police interrogation,'2 in Duckworth it approved warnings that
deviate so far from Miranda's language that they arguably do not clearly
inform a suspect of the rights she has when subjected to that interrogation.
Prior to Duckworth, the Court justified retreating from Miranda by
emphasizing that if a defendant has received clear notice of her rights, she
is sufficiently informed to make a knowing and intelligent decision about
whether to waive them. In Duckworth, however, the Court seemed to ignore
the reasoning of its prior decisions. The Duckworth defendant argued that
he did not voluntarily waive his rights because he did not receive clear
notice of them. And yet the Court held that his decision to waive those
rights was informed-in spite of the fact that it could not say the warnings
he received were clear.
Therefore, Duckworth is significant for two reasons. Unlike previous
decisions it did not require the state to show that the harm to suspects-
potentially confusing Miranda warnings-furthered a law enforcement in-
terest in order to justify an added psychological compulsion in interroga-
tions. Also, unlike prior decisions allowing additional compulsion so long
as the warnings were at some point made clear, in Duckworth that additional
compulsion resulted from the lack of clarity in the warnings themselves.
The Supreme Court does not require that Miranda warnings be any clearer
than the Court itself has been about the state of Miranda as a safeguard
for the rights of crimnal suspects. One thing is clear, however. Although
Miranda is still somewhat useful to suspects and to the criminal justice
system, it has been reduced to a skeleton of its former self.
were not such a convenient backstop, the Court might be more willing to flesh out due process
constraints on police elicitation of statements from suspects."). However, it seems unlikely if
Miranda were overruled, courts would exclude many statements based on defendants' testimony
that they felt compelled to speak to the police. At least with the Miranda warnings, suspects
are informed of their right to silence and their right to counsel.
125. Grano, supra note 26, at 663-64.
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Clara Shortridge Foltz strikes a victorious pose wearing a symbolic mortarboard
and the dress in which she argued her right to attend law school.
0. SHUCK, HISTORY OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF CALIFORNIA (1901).

